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Globally there remains great interest in the closely-held company 1.   Yet in many Corporate 
Law systems such entities stand out by reason of their lack of formal legislative recognition. 
In contrast, the UK and Commonwealth courts have accepted that there is a distinct 
category of firm known as the “close company” (often characterised as the “quasi 
partnership”) and have modified principles of corporate law to give effect to that 
perception.   This paper will evaluate that judicial adaptation phenomenon in the light of 
possible further judicial customisation of corporate law and prospective legislative action in 
the field. 
 
Close companies and quasi partnerships defined 
With no formal recognition of close companies in UK Corporate Law it is difficult to offer a 
definition that will attract consensus.  We sense what a close company is, but pinning down 
fundamentals is difficult2.  What seems clear in the paradigm situation is that a close 
company is a species of private company3.  Shares in a close company are not freely 
transferable; that is the same position as in a partnership as prescribed in effect by s. 24(7) 
of the Partnership Act 1890.   There is a well-established definition (dating back to the 
1920s) of close companies in the UK Income and Corporation Taxes Act 2010 ss. 439 and 
450 with the maximum membership for fiscal purposes being fixed at 5.  Other jurisdictions 
use a higher figure for corporate law purposes, with some permitting up to 30 members for 
a close company4. One advantage in having membership capped is that there is an 
expectation that all members will play a managerial role5.  In certain jurisdictions that 
envisioned managerial participation develops into a scenario in which the board of directors 
is scrapped, with members taking the managerial helm6.  That represents a departure from 
the orthodox UK position where under Art 3 of the Model Articles for Private Companies in 
the  Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/3229) the directors enjoy the 
managerial prerogative and shareholders can according to Art 4 only trespass into the 
managerial sphere in extreme circumstances by use of special resolution. 
We have clearer guidance on what is required for a quasi partnership to exist.   Ebrahimi v 
Westbourne Galleries Ltd7 highlights three common indicia for a company to be 
characterised as a quasi partnership. Firstly, it would be based upon a previous business 
association – i.e. a partnership.  There would be an expectation that all members would 
participate in the management of the company, as is the case in a traditional partnership8.  
There would also be share transfer restrictions, as in a partnership.  It is not necessary for all 
three indicia to be present to create a quasi partnership, but, as they are interlinked, it is 
common to find these three characteristics working in unison.  We note that a company can 
become a quasi partnership (or indeed lose that descriptor) at some stage in its life after 
incorporation9.  An individual might become a quasi partner in the company at some point 
in the company’s evolution after incorporation10 and then lose that status subsequently.  A 
quasi partner de novo might surrender that status and  become a dormant participator.  The 
permutations are endless.   
From the above we might conclude that for UK Corporate Law purposes, all quasi 
partnerships qualify as close companies, but not all close companies are quasi partnerships. 
 
The challenge of closely-held companies  
To what extent should the established principles of Corporate Law give way to the reality of 
the relationships between stakeholders that exist within a close company?   There are two 
ways of looking at this conundrum. 
From a purely internal perspective there is much to be said for allowing flexible private 
ordering.  A close company is in essence an incorporated partnership and therefore the 
members of that association should be allowed to define their relationship inter se with the 
statutory regime applying only in default.  This is what happens in the traditional 
partnership11.  The partnership influence in this area of corporate law has been marked. But 
it would be wrong to assume that partnership principles will always operate to the exclusion 
of corporate norms in mapping out that relationship.  So, in O’Donnell v Shanahan12 the 
Court of Appeal eschewed the opportunity to apply a liberal partnership law principle 
dealing with private profits13 obtained by a participator, and instead opted for a stricter 
corporate law prohibitory norm.  The Court of Appeal determined that a private profit is to 
be accounted for in the close company context, even if it could not have been earned by the 
company itself. 
Addressing this question from an external viewpoint different considerations come into 
play.  Members of a close company enjoy the facility of limited liability, so it is natural that 
they should bear the burdens associated with the grant of that economic licence.  Those 
burdens typically relate to disclosure of information and share capital maintenance, both 
deemed necessary to protect creditors’ interests.  That said, for SMEs using the private 
company form, those restrictions have lessened since 1981 as the deregulation bandwagon 
has rolled forward.  However, those concessions are dependent upon criteria related to the 
size of the company’s business and are not directed towards the composition of its 
underlying membership.  They are also concessions granted by the legislature and not via 
judicial whim. 
 
Meeting the challenge: historical evolution  
Close companies have been around for many decades.  In the same way that the private 
company was recognised in practice14 long before it received legislative approval in the 
Companies Act 1907, so the same may be said of the close company.  In terms of UK 
Corporate Law discourse the designation of close company first surfaced in the 1950s 
through the work of academics such as Gower15.  Like many terms used in Corporate Law 
today, the US linguistic heritage is obvious.  Close corporations have operated in many US 
states for some time.  Discrete legislative facilities, which were first offered to them in the 
USA in the 1950s, have taken a variety of forms since then16.  A customised variant, the LLC, 
first surfaced in Wyoming17 in 1977 and there is now a Revised Uniform LLC Act (first drafted 
in 1995 and revised on a number of occasions since then) to provide a flexible model for 
other states wishing to follow suit.  However, the problem we have if we focus unduly on 
the US position is that the close corporation in that part of the world is in fact usually 
equated with what would appear to be our standard private company.  So, in fact English 
law, which formally imported the private company from the Continent at the start of the 
20th century18, has built up greater experience of regulating this type of firm.  It has drawn 
upon a partnership heritage to do so. 
How has English Law responded to the close company phenomenon?  That adaptation has 
rested largely upon judicial creativity.  Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd19 confirms that the most 
fundamental attribute of a company (namely separate corporate personality) must be 
extended to a close company.   This ruling of a full panel of the House of Lords attracted the 
ire of some commentators20 because of its potential for abuse, but its current status as the 
dominant Company Law precedent is unquestioned21.   
A move towards the discrete regulation of close companies emerged in 1945 via the 
proposals in para 53 of the Cohen Committee on Company Law Amendment (Cmd 6659). 
These sought to preserve the concessions currently available to all private companies solely 
for the benefit of a smaller cohort known as “exempt private companies”.  This new exempt 
status would continue to offer relief from certain disclosure requirements and from the 
curbs on loans to directors.  These proposals took statutory form in s. 129 of the Companies 
Act 1948.  However, they soon attracted concern among policymakers.  One problem was 
that something like 70% of private companies were capable of benefitting from them22.  The 
exempt category was in fact the norm!  There were also difficulties in defining exactly what 
was to be regarded as an exempt private company, as reflected in litigation23.  The Jenkins 
Committee (1962) (Cmnd 1749) para 63(a) called for this experiment to be abandoned and 
that recommendation was implemented by s. 2 of the Companies Act 196724. 
In spite of this legislative setback, voices calling for special treatment for closely-held 
companies were not silenced.  An authority of some perceived historical significance is Re 
Duomatic Ltd25.  Here Buckley J recognised that in the context of a small private company 
the mandatory statutory provisions on shareholder resolutions could be sidestepped by 
applying a principle of unanimous assent.  In fact, any historian26 of Company Law would 
remind us that this conclusion was not novel27 , but it had never been so clearly expressed 
as it was in the following words: 
“ …… I proceed on the basis that where it can be shown that all shareholders who have a 
right to attend and vote at a general meeting of the company assent to some matter which a 
general meeting of the company could carry into effect, that assent is  as binding as a 
resolution in general meeting would be.”28 
This principle, which rests upon an estoppel, has since been refined and applied in a range 
of contexts. It is recognised as authoritative in common law jurisdictions, such as Australia29, 
British Virgin Islands30, Canada31, Hong Kong32, India33, Ireland34, Malaysia, New Zealand35 , 
Singapore36 and South Africa37.  It provides an example of how Company Law regulatory 
models can converge across the globe through the processes of common law jurisprudence. 
We return later to the operation of this particular precedent simply because it provides the 
clearest example of judicial adaptation at work.  Indeed, it has inspired a legislative adjunct 
in the form of the written resolution38, but in the UK it has steadfastly resisted suggestions 
that it should be incorporated wholesale into the legislative matrix.  The Company Law 
Review  in its Final Report (URN 01/942) of July 2001 favoured (at paras 7.2—7.26) statutory 
consolidation, but the Government in its subsequent White Paper, Modernising Company 
Law (Cm 5553, 2002) came out against legislative codification of the principle (see paras 
2.34 and 2.35).  A reasonable interpretation of s. 281(4) of the Companies Act 2006 would 
suggest that for the purposes of that section it is preserved by virtue of being a “rule of 
law”.  It would also appear to be recognised more explicitly through the saving terms of the 
ratification provision found in s. 239(6)(a) of the 2006 Act. 
Another watershed is Bushell v Faith39.  Here the House of Lords by a majority upheld the 
decision of the Court of Appeal ruling that in a close company the members could agree a 
system of weighted voting rights which would have the practical effect of preventing the 
passing of an ordinary resolution to dismiss a director under what is now s. 168 of the 
Companies Act 2006.  This conclusion, undermining a sacred tenet of corporate governance, 
was controversial40 when it was handed down; indeed there were moves made to effect a 
statutory repeal, but these came to nothing in English Law41.  However, a weighted votes 
clause would only be acceptable in a close company context, a point stressed by Lord 
Donovan42, who noted the partnership perspective: 
    “And there may be good reasons why Parliament should leave some companies with     
freedom of manoeuvre in this particular matter.  There are many small companies  which are 
conducted in practice as though they were little more than partnerships, particularly family 
companies running a family business; and it is, unfortunately, sometimes necessary to 
provide some safeguards against family quarrels having their repercussions in the 
boardroom.” 
The House of Lords handed down its ruling in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd43  two 
years later and broadened the options for a participator to realise an investment in a 
solvent close company via a “just and equitable” winding up.  Where there was a quasi-
partnership company, which would typically have some or all of three characteristics 
relating to prior association, participation in management and share transfer curbs, 
established norms of corporate law might give way to equitable considerations.  This is 
necessary because this combination of conditions could produce a situation where a 
founder member of a company was excluded from management, denied an income 
(because no dividends were paid) and was forced to see his capital used for the benefit of 
the remaining participators.  Escape would not be possible due to restrictions on transfer. 
Lord Wilberforce explained (at 379) why this flexibility was permitted: 
    “a limited company is more than a mere judicial entity, with a personality in law of its 
own; that there is room in company law for recognition of the fact that behind it or amongst 
it there are individuals with rights, expectations and obligations inter se which are not 
necessarily submerged in the company structure.“ 
The House of Lords viewed the petitioner’s predicament as unfair (even though it had not 
resulted from technical breaches of current company law) and were prepared to order the 
drastic remedy of a winding up on “just and equitable” grounds to prevent its continuance.  
At the time, the alternative remedy of ordering a share buyout under what is now s. 996 of 
the Companies Act 2006 resulting from a finding of unfair prejudice was not practically 
possible because of the limitations of the then statutory provision. 
The court is reluctant to opt for winding up on the just and equitable ground because it is a 
drastic solution capable of causing collateral harm to innocent stakeholders.  This will only 
be permitted if the company is solvent and the court will always be alert for ways to sever 
the Gordian knot without liquidation.  But that may not be possible.  Witness Re Brand and 
Harding Ltd44 where Roth J felt compelled to order the winding up of a family quasi 
partnership business because the prospects of securing cooperation to value the interest of 
a party seeking an exit were slim.  Compare this with Maresca v Brookfield Development and 
Construction Ltd 45 where Norris J was able to resolve the exit problem without the need for 
ordering a winding up on the just and equitable ground.  
Although the judicial role in adaptation of companies’ legislation to the needs of close 
companies is thus established in the above cases, we must be careful not to overstate the 
argument for departing from standard corporate law norms where there is a closely-held 
company.   O’Neill v Phillips46 shows that equitable considerations do not always trump the 
need for commercial certainty as the House of Lords was at pains to circumscribe the notion 
of legitimate expectations so as to prevent it being used in an unfair prejudice petition in 
circumstances where it lacked any orthodox legal foundation.  To be disappointed as a 
shareholder is not to be equated with being the victim of unfair prejudice. This adherence to 
corporate law orthodoxy in the face of the social and cultural environment upon which a 
small company has been constructed has been mirrored in the family company context47.  
There seems little doubt that the House of Lords wanted to damp down the fires of unfair 
prejudice litigation, which at that time raged with particular ferocity in the close company 
context.  The Law Commission in its 1997 Report, Shareholder Remedies (LC No 246, Cm 
3769) had thought along similar lines and it is likely that the House of Lords were translating 
its thoughts into legal precedent.  That desire was also evident in Lord Hoffmann’s approach 
towards encouraging buyout offers made to petitioners to forestall unfair prejudice 
litigation. 
So we can see that there is a body of jurisprudence favouring adaptation in the case of close 
companies, but also can note that there are dissenting voices highlighting the inherent 
dangers in departing from prescribed regulatory regimes established by Parliament.  Judicial 
adaptation can create uncertainty in a way that should be less obvious in legislation. 
 
Procedural flexibility: Duomatic refined 
Since 1969 the UK courts (and their common law counterparts) have had opportunities to 
revisit the Duomatic principle in a range of situations48.  The principle is capable of 
application in a variety of contexts where a shareholder resolution is required, but has not 
been passed. Invariably the companies concerned are close companies.  This need to rely on 
the Duomatic concession illustrates the reality of how SMEs often fail to comply with formal 
corporate law procedures.  This may be due to the fact that such firms frequently operate 
with limited professional support.  Since 2008 such companies are no longer required to 
have a company secretary, as s. 270 of the Companies Act 2006 indicates49.  In truth, 
informal assent is often raised in an attempt to shield directors from the consequences of 
their failure to ensure proper corporate procedures are followed in the close company 
context.  This may be an important safety valve because the judiciary are notoriously 
reluctant to offer relief to defaulting officers if they throw themselves upon the court’s 
mercy under s. 1157 of the Companies Act 2006. 
The Duomatic principle is based upon the unanimous assent of voting shareholders 
supplanting the need for a formal resolution on their part.  The principle can apply where 
the resolution required is from a class of shareholders, rather than shareholders in 
general50.  In order to invoke the principle of informal assent it is not necessary to show that 
such assent was given concurrently at a particular meeting. But any assent must be the 
result of a conscious decision to agree to a specified course of action.  The courts are 
reluctant to infer assent simply because a matter has been drawn to the attention of 
shareholders without any real effort to discuss it51.  As Newey J said in Rolfe v Rolfe52 there 
has to be some outward manifestation of assent.  A leading authority on the status of 
Duomatic is Schofield v Schofield53.  In this instance the Court of Appeal stressed the need 
for objective evidence of assent; mere presence at a meeting without raising any objection 
to a proposed course of action would not necessarily suffice54.  Etherton LJ was quite 
insistent upon this qualification in para [41] of the judgment.  This need for objectivity might 
serve to explain the thinking of Oliver J in Re New Cedos Engineering Co Ltd55 where the idea 
that the private thoughts of a sole shareholder might be used to invoke the Duomatic 
principle were roundly dismissed by the court. 
Particular difficulties arise where certain shareholders are only present at critical meetings 
through a proxy or other representative56.  We must also remember that shares can have 
both legal and beneficial owners.  What seems likely from the comments of Hart J in Deakin 
v Faulding57 is that the beneficial owners are capable of giving the necessary assent. That 
said, the point did hinge very much upon the particular circumstances of that case.  But if 
there are multiple beneficial owners of a share the better view is that the assent of all such 
owners is required58.   In order to rely on the Duomatic principle the shareholders must have 
acted in good faith and honestly in assenting to a course of action59. 
In deciding whether to apply Duomatic or not the courts will ask themselves what the 
underlying purpose of the procedure that has been disregarded is.   If it is there for 
protecting the interests of creditors (or some other third party) they will be reluctant to 
permit latitude60, but if it is purely for the domestic consumption of shareholders a more 
relaxed attitude might be displayed61.  In Cane v Jones62 the principle was deployed to 
permit what amounted to an informal variation of the articles of association. That said, the 
trend in recent years has been to make the concessionary principle applicable to a wide 
range of matters requiring shareholder resolutions63.   
The Duomatic concession cannot operate to displace the right of directors to manage.  But 
in the close company scenario that undermining of management is not a likely possibility 
because the shareholders and directors often are the same individuals.   
A major limitation on the usage of the Duomatic principle is that it can only operate in 
circumstances where the company is solvent.  If the company is insolvent (or doubtfully 
solvent) the court will not allow informality64.  The rationale here is that once the company 
has lost its financial stability the shareholders’ tangible economic interest in it disappears 
and it is the emerging creditor interest that should be prioritised65.  The message for those 
who operate a close company is clear – relying on judicial concessions permitting informality 
is a dangerous game66. 
Finally, Duomatic cannot be employed to undertake an activity that would not in any case 
be permitted by Company Law even if there was strict adherence to procedural rules67. 
Procedural flexibility has its limits. 
The Duomatic principle was revisited in Re BW Estates Ltd (No. 2)68, which was concerned 
with the validity of appointment of administrators by an inquorate board.    The 
appointment was challenged on the grounds that it could not be shown that all of the 
shareholders had assented to a change in the articles reducing the quorum required for 
board meetings.  At first instance69 HHJ Purle QC applied Duomatic to validate the 
appointment.  On appeal the Court of Appeal took a different view70.  Duomatic could not 
apply because there were two registered shareholders and, as one of these was a dissolved 
company, there was no way in which it could have assented to the articles being changed to 
facilitate the appointment of the administrators. 
The widespread adoption of the unanimous assent concession in common law jurisdictions 
must say something about the logic underpinning it.  Slavish adherence to formal 
procedures attracts little support in any quarter.  Judicial validation of procedural shortfall 
supports security of transaction by frustrating counterparty opportunism. Permitting 
informality in decision-making may also reduce administrative costs.  We note here by way 
of analogy the wide range of decision-making options now available under Insolvency 
(England and Wales) Rules 2016 (SI 2016/1024) Part 15 to creditors of insolvent companies, 
all designed to cut red tape and costs.  But, although such formal determination procedures 
may appear to have little value in themselves, the mere fact that they are prescribed may 
mean that any decision reached on the basis of said procedures is the product of considered 
reflection.  When we are dealing with limited companies in which a range of stakeholders 
(and not merely shareholders) have a legitimate interest71, there is something to be said for 
encouraging deliberation72.  Duomatic at heart reflects shareholder primacy philosophy, 
whereas the 21st century company has to serve wider interests.  There may also be a link 
between lax corporate governance and corporate failure73. Furthermore, in the modern era 
it is possible to communicate with shareholders electronically without requiring attendance 
at a meeting.  That fact of technological advance might undermine a line of authority that 
has stood for many years and was based upon modes of communication familiar to the 
Victorians. 
 
Contractual underpinning and the “close” nexus74 
The existence of an agreement outside the traditional constitution of the company is a 
common (but not inevitable) feature of most close companies, though perhaps less so for 
family firms.  Indeed, it is the very existence of such an agreement that may justify 
departure from the strict requirements of Company Law75.  Where such an agreement exists 
the usual contractual questions about the terms of the agreement, and whether it may be 
varied, arise.  Variation of a shareholder agreement will depend upon the terms of said 
agreement and will usually require unanimity.  It may be that the shareholder agreement 
may require the assent of the company, but this is fraught with difficulty76.  A formal 
variation procedure may be specified, but it does appear that there is scope for the 
Duomatic principle to come into play, as Mummery LJ concluded in the Court of Appeal in 
Euro Brokers Holdings Ltd v Monecor (London) Ltd77. Shareholder agreements will retain 
their importance in this particular corporate context notwithstanding the introduction by s. 
22 of the Companies Act 2006 of the possibility of entrenching articles of association78.  
Such agreements are more flexible and are easier to customise. 
Does the close company automatically produce a fiduciary relationship between its 
participators?   The orthodox answer to this question should be in the negative.  Any 
fiduciary relationship found to exist will be between individual members and the company 
itself79.  This point, which reflects the separate status of the firm, has recently been 
confirmed in the LLP context80.  This exclusionary argument is reinforced by the fact that 
participators in a close company will often operate under a shareholder agreement and, 
barring the introduction of explicit fiduciary duties by said agreement, the English courts will 
not willingly create fiduciary obligations on the back of a contract. 
A close relationship does not mean that disagreement is out of the question. There are a 
range of remedies available to a disgruntled shareholder in a close company.  These 
however require recourse to the court.  There is no automatic exit option to realise one’s 
investment.  Lord Hoffmann stressed this in O’Neill v Phillips81 and the Law Commission in 
1997 in Shareholder Remedies (LC 246, Cm 3769) had at para 3.66 also rejected this idea 
previously.  This contrasts with the idea of appraisal rights in defined circumstances, as 
pioneered by US Corporate Law. 
In recent decades it has become the norm for shareholder agreements to include a 
compulsory arbitration clause to address shareholder disputes, thereby avoiding damaging 
publicity in the courts.  Can such a provision, by virtue of s. 9 of the Arbitration Act 1996, be 
used to block an application to the court for statutory relief?  The authorities here were 
initially contradictory82, but the Court of Appeal clarified matters in Fulham FC (1987) Ltd v 
Richards83.  The company here ran the Premier League with 20 football club members each 
owning one share. It was a closely-held company, but an unusual one at that. A club in 
dispute with the League wished to pursue a s. 994 petition. The Court of Appeal ruled that 
the arbitration mechanism should be respected because the arbitrator could provide the 
remedies sought under this unfair prejudice petition.  This ruling confirms the primacy of 
the contractual nexus in close companies.  But it has its limits; a winding up remedy cannot 
be awarded by an arbitrator, so a just and equitable petition would have to proceed to the 
court. 
A related issue concerns the effect of one participator leaving the association.  This is where 
we have to confront so-called “tag along” and “drag along” clauses.  To explain, the former 
clause allows a minority shareholder to follow the exit of the leading shareholder by having 
shares purchased at fair value, whilst a drag along clause compels a minority shareholder to 
sell up if the primary shareholder wishes to leave the company and to sell his interest in the 
business to an outsider84.  Some consideration of these questions is to be found in Constable 
v Executive Connections Ltd85.  The case is problematical because it involves an attempt to 
alter established articles of association to introduce a drag along provision.  This is 
inherently more objectionable than having such a clause in the constitution de novo.  The 
value of this precedent is further limited by virtue of the fact that it involved an application 
for an interim injunction to restrain said alteration pending a full trial. Nevertheless, on the 
facts of the case, Christopher Nugee QC ruled that it was arguable that this attempt to 
introduce a drag along facility constituted an abuse of majority power and should be 
restrained pending trial.  Notwithstanding these points, drag along clauses are now common 
in close company constitutions and it would seem implicit in the Court of Appeal ruling in 
Arbuthnott v Bonnyman 86 that they are not inherently objectionable. 
 
Should we move towards formal legislative recognition of close companies? 
It is apparent that there is little explicit legislative recognition of the special needs of closely-
held companies in English law.  True, there are sections in the Companies Act 2006 that are 
particularly apposite, such as s. 306, which empowers the court to summon a shareholder 
meeting in contravention of quorum requirements so as to enable a deadlock to be broken.  
This was modified in 1948 to permit one member meetings and thus to be of particular 
value in the quasi partnership context.  Section 994 is also particularly relevant to close 
companies, as is the just and equitable winding up provision in s. 122(1)(g) of the Insolvency 
Act 1986.  Notwithstanding, we have a growing number of provisions that offer exemptions 
according to the economic size of the business operation linked to assets, turnover and 
number of employees.  Clearly such concessions will by definition apply to SMEs, but many 
SMEs do not fall under the closely-held company category. 
There is broad agreement that close companies require some form of statutory regulation 
because they employ the device of limited liability with all of the dangers for outside parties 
that flow from it87. Close companies cannot be left entirely as creatures of contract.  The 
question therefore is what form that regulation should take. 
The arguments for a new dedicated legislative treatment are reasonably well balanced here.  
On the one hand, there is much to be said for a self-contained legislative code for close 
companies88.  This might provide a further boost to small enterprise by reducing transaction 
costs in drafting customised shareholder agreements.  It would strike a chord with the 
“Think Small First” mantra.  But, as we have seen above, one of the hallmarks of the close 
company is the degree of contractual flexibility.  A discrete legislative framework for close 
companies might therefore provide little additional value89, apart from providing a model to 
be adopted in default of explicit agreement.  It might even result in additional costs if a close 
company then transitioned into a larger private company thereby requiring re-registration.  
Attempts to provide discrete regulation for smaller type companies have not met with 
universal success.  Although the division of companies into small and medium-sized for 
accounts/audit purposes is well established, trying to develop discrete regulation in other 
areas has proved a challenge.  The Law Commission grappled with this problem when 
reviewing shareholder remedies two decades ago90.  Moreover, the experiment conducted 
via  Insolvency Act 2000 s. 1 (inserting Schedule A1 into the Insolvency Act 1986) of 
developing a dedicated rescue procedure by customising a variant of the company voluntary 
arrangement mechanism for small companies has proved to be a miserable failure. 
The Company Law Review (1997-2001) revisited the question in its major study of UK 
corporate law.  In its Final Report in July 2001 (URN 01/942) it supported the status quo as 
far as the classification of companies was concerned.  It did not favour a special regime for 
close companies.  It did however at paras 7.20-7.26 recommend converting the common 
law Duomatic principle into a statutory concession as it felt that this would be more user-
friendly for entrepreneurs who exploit the small company format.  But In the follow-up 
White Paper of July 2002, Modernising Company Law (Cm 5553) the government (at paras 
2.34 and 2.35) rejected this proposal, preferring instead to leave the matter to the evolving 
common law.  One advantage in this approach is that Duomatic will retain its preeminent 
status across the common law world and in turn will allow for the jurisprudence to be 
refreshed from a variety of sources. A common law rule that evolves in this organic way can 
provide the basis for a more successful legal transplant. 
Moving into practical politics, the fact that English Law has not provided a fully discrete 
statutory framework for private companies91 might suggest a lack of appetite for providing a 
designer menu for a more restricted category of firm within the private company 
constituency.  A similar lack of legislative action is apparent with regard to group companies, 
where the courts have been left to devise a regulatory solution based largely upon the 
separate identity of group members.  Most registered companies in the UK would fall under 
the close classification and much of the commercial activity carried out in the corporate 
sector is conducted via a group structure; the failure of the legislator directly to address 
these realities on the ground speaks volumes. The obsession with the larger self-standing 
company having a marked separation of ownership and control persists. Compare this static 
approach with the legislative willingness to provide discrete structures for single member 
companies92, LLPs93 and Community Interest Companies94.  Latterly, we have seen the 
introduction of a modified form of limited partnership for hedge funds via The Legislative 
Reform (Private Fund Limited Partnerships) Order 2017 (SI 2017/514), a reform which 
waters down some of the traditional restrictions on the participation in management by 
limited partners.  
What does the experience of other jurisdictions tell us about explicit treatment of close 
companies?  South Africa had a close corporation regime for the years from 1984-2011.  
This radical regime, inspired by unconsummated UK proposals for reform95, did away with 
the notion of shares and instead provided for participators to have percentage interests in 
the company96.  In spite of the plaudits it received97 it was scrapped in terms of any future 
incorporations of such entities in 2011 when the South African Companies Act 2008 took 
effect.  But existing close corporations were not disestablished and many thousands still 
operate.  The reasons for this abandonment of the close corporation experiment are hard to 
fathom, but it may well be that the policymakers felt that the existence of this category 
over-complicated corporate law.  The position today is that the close company does exist in 
attenuated form but the discrete category of close corporation has been left to wither on 
the vine98. 
 Australia had a short flirtation with discrete regulation of close companies under the Close 
Corporations Act 1989.  But that legislation, which was less radical than the South African 
model, along with other attempts to provide a federal corporate law regime, fell apart in the 
constitutional crises of the 1990s.  The Corporations Law 2001, which flowed from a 
constitutional settlement, does not offer a discrete menu for close corporations.  New 
Zealand, which is noted for its radical Companies Act 1993, also fails to make significant 
special provision for closely-held companies99. 
Ireland recently reconfigured its corporate law statutes in a major reform.  The Companies 
Act 2014 mirrors the UK model in terms of its magnitude, though it does pay greater heed to 
the needs of small companies by working on the assumption that the legislation is geared 
towards the private company user, whilst making special provision for public companies.  It 
does make provision for what is termed a CLS company100, which is a deregulated form of 
the private company with unlimited capacity and able to dispense with many formal 
requirements as to meetings.  This is a positive development. However, once again, there is 
no explicit legislative recognition of close companies.  The unanimous assent principle 
remains the preserve of common law in Ireland. 
 
Conclusion 
The fundamental problem posed by the close company is that it was not on the radar when 
the great step forward in Company Law took place in the mid 19th century with the advent 
of registered companies with limited liability.  The law has had to play “catch up” since then.  
We have had to progress from a one dimensional view of the company to a more diverse 
and nuanced perspective. Both the courts and the legislature have played a part in this 
process of adapting a standard business model to the close company reality.  This 
experience is not unique.  Witness the evolution of the group of companies at the other end 
of the commercial scale.  Arguably much less has been achieved in terms of adapting 
Company Law to the reality of groups than has been achieved for close companies.  
The pattern of development outlined above reflects the incorporation of “equitable” 
principles into the classic Corporate Law mix.  This has been achieved by inventing the quasi 
partnership construct and by refusing to allow rigid adherence to procedural formalism to 
produce an inequitable outcome.  The advent through legislation of the unfair prejudice 
jurisdiction since 1980 has also created opportunities for the introduction of equitable 
perspectives into the close company arena101.  A major advance in the future would be the 
acceptance of the existence of directly enforceable fiduciary duties between participators in 
a close company.  One suspects that is a step that the courts are reluctant to take for fear of 
opening a Pandora’s box of legal complexity and litigation. We should bear in mind that in 
the UK most shareholder litigation arises in the close company context and there may be 
public policy reasons for keeping such litigation under control.    Similarly, the idea of 
granting automatic exit or appraisal rights for investors in close companies has been 
shunned in view of its potential to cause economic disruption in the SME sector where a 
sudden loss of capital could be a disaster.  These concerns are understandable but, it is 
submitted, that they may be overblown because such inherent dangers may be controlled 
through contract and the good sense of the judiciary, who have developed a constructive 
set of effective rules in English Law for close companies. 
UK Corporate Law has, through judicial ingenuity, done much to create a discrete regulatory 
regime for the close company.  Parliament has had limited input in this process of blurring 
the lines between the paradigm corporate and partnership forms. The legislature has taken 
a passive role by not overturning “creative” judicial rulings and by refusing to convert 
common law jurisprudence into statutory rule.  The instrumentality of Contract has been 
obvious in providing the equivalent of “fusion food” on the menu for partaking 
entrepreneurs.  The courts have navigated a fine balance that exists between upholding a 
respect for fundamental principle whilst introducing the necessary adaptations to reflect the 
underlying relationships that exist within companies.   Farrar102 characterised this as a 
process of “fact-based jurisprudence”.  In the opinion of the present author, the courts 
should be left to continue this incremental process without the need for general statutory 
interference in the form of a discrete regulatory matrix.  Indeed, some of the heat has been 
taken out of the debate here since 2001 with the introduction of the limited liability 
partnership via the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 as this provides a structure for 
the small family business which combines many of the positive features of limited 
companies and partnerships.  This new vehicle is available for all forms of business and is 
not restricted to professional groups.  But it does require a minimum of two members.  
If the legislature wanted to the test the water in developing a less radical strategy it might 
wish to introduce a compulsory arbitration facility for disputes arising in the context of a 
closely-held company.  Again, the problem of definition could complicate this initiative, but 
the issue is not unsurmountable.  An alternative would be to exclude the s. 994 unfair 
prejudice jurisdiction from close companies, unless it were specifically envisaged by 
shareholder agreement. A variant on this latter solution has been favoured in LLP law103.  
Questions of definition might also frustrate this approach, which could only work if we had a 
clear definition of a closely-held company. LLPs are a distinct category of legal person that 
require separate registration.  We do not have that clarity at the moment for closely-held 
companies, so it is best left to the participators through contract to resolve this matter for 
themselves, albeit at the risk of some form of judicial “review”. 
 
 
Notwithstanding this, in view of the high percentage of close companies within the private 
company constituency, there is something to be said for revisiting the option of a separate 
legislative regime for private companies generally.  The courts cannot take on this major 
task.  Many other jurisdictions, particularly in Europe, have gone down this road, but the UK 
has declined to follow.  Instead, we have a mammoth Companies Act with numerous areas 
of segregated provision for private companies.  A further gloss is then added by the courts 
to modify the position for close companies.  Hardly a user friendly approach!   In the post-
Brexit world the introduction of a customised private company regime would reassure UK 
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